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Sophisticated microchip devices are available for identifying stray
animals. Implants about the size of a grain of rice have been a great
boon for owners with lost or stolen pets. One distributor of chips has
reported that it has already implanted over six million.1 A pet owner
can be assured that the chances of recovering a lost animal are greatly
increased. At the pound, a stray can quickly be scanned, and, if it has a
microchip, the animal's owner can be identified.
Is it not then conceivable that this technology might be applied to
humans? Indeed, such predictions have already been made. For
example, Alan Westin discussed the possibility of "permanent
implacements of 'tagging' devices on or in the body" as early as
1967.2 If the technology were extended to humans, a myriad of
identification-related applications could be envisaged such as the
capability to find lost children or confused Alzheimer's patients, or to
Dr. Ramesh is an attorney in the Patent and Licensing Department of Nalco
Chemical Co., Naperville, IL. She holds a B.S. in Chemistry, State University of
NY-Buffalo; a Ph.D. in Chemistry, Texas A&M University and a J.D., Chicago-Kent
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1 The device is easily implanted by means of injection through a needle, into the
shoulder of the animal. A hand-held or pass-by scanner is used to check the animal for
the presence of the microchip. Richard Louv, Walking Around With A Chip in its
Shoulder, The San Diego Union-Trib., June 15, 1994, at A-2.
2 The author also stated that "[elxisting microminiaturized transmitters the size of
a pinhead might be coded with an identification number, enclosed in a permanent
capsule, and implanted under the skin by a simple and painless surgical operation.
Once in place, this tag would do no damage to the body, but when 'interrogated'
electronically by an outside beam, it would emit an identifying number." Alan F.
Westin, Privacy and Freedom 86 (1967). However, proving that old adage that there
is nothing new under the sun, the concept may be attributed to far earlier authors. The
Book of Revelation of the Bible contains the following statement: "He also forced
everyone, small and great, to receive a mark on his right hand or on his forehead, so
that no one could buy or sell unless he had the mark, which is the name of the beast or
the number of his name." Revelation 13:16-17. That mark could well be the
microchip implant.
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determine if job applicants are illegal immigrants or criminals. By
encoding the microchip only with a single number, it might also carry,
e.g., medical or criminal history. Also, devices can be used for tracking.
Although each such application has utility, privacy implications are
ominous. The level of intrusion 3 necessitated by implantation may be
objectionable, for there are many legal rights which would be impinged
upon. It is plausible that, since the technology has not yet been
perfected, there is no need to address the incipient legal problems until
devices are used.4 However, because of the very drastic reductions in
personal liberty and privacy that such implantation represents, the legal
ramifications need to be explored now. The reasons that a mandatory
program of implantation for all citizens must be necessary for an
identification program to be effective will be explored. 5 A system
using the technology, once in place, may be difficult to dislodge
despite limitations of individual freedoms because its advantages will be
extremely attractive. The positive applications may be said to outweigh
the detrimental legal consequences at that time. Therefore it is not too
soon to consider the repercussions that mandatory microchip
implantation would have, as a pre-emptive measure.6
The first part will explore the technology and discuss possible
applications for microchip implantation into humans. The second will
discuss common law, constitutional, and property rights affected by
mandatory implantation. Last, we consider protections that can be
effectuated if the technology is used.
3 Intrusion does not refer to the physical act of implantation but rather the effect
that the implantation will have on the individual's control over his body and on his
privacy rights.
4 This view was adopted by Justice Rehnquist in a Supreme Court decision
concerning beeper surveillance where the respondent had indicated that if beeper
surveillance were constitutional, "twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this
country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision." The opinion
stated 'if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different
constitutional principles may be applicable." U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983).
5 It has been recognized that "[a] true national identity document would be
mandatory". Robert Ellis Smith, The True Terror is in the Card, The NewYork
Times, Sept. 8, 1996 at 58.
6 The statement by Justice Rehnquist that there will be time enough to consider
legal ramifications of incipient technologies as they arise is inapplicable in this case
because of the dire consequences to humans involved.
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The Microchip Implant
The Animal Model
Microchips are about the size of a grain of rice and coated with
biocompatible glass. Upon implantation by syringe, connective tissue
should form to prevent migration. 7 The procedure is very low-cost
and simple.8 All chips are implanted in the same place (between the
shoulder blades) so that they will be easy to find and read. To identify
a pet, a scanner passed over the animal reads a twelve character
identifier from the implanted transponder microchip and displays it on
a screen. 9 The owner's name and address can be obtained from a
registry with a toll-free phone call. The current market for these devices
includes pet, livestock and laboratory animal industries. 10
Though the technology is quite useful, some problems have already
surfaced. The first arises because of a multiplicity of manufacturers. 11
Each makes his own scanner to read his particular chips, not those of
competitors. 12 The second is that because of their novelty, their
longevity is uncertain.
Emerging Human Technology
There are indications that science is moving inexorably closer to the
use of microchips in humans. In fact, some have described human
implantation as inevitable. 13 For example, a U.S. patent discloses
microchips implanted in teeth.14 Carrying information on a microchip
7 Betsy Siino, Where Will the Chips Fall? Innovations in Pet Identification
Systems, 47 Pet Product News 24 (1993).
8 The procedure costs $30 and there is a $15 fee for listing in the registry. The
scanner costs more than $400. Mary Stephens, Chip Implant Eases Lost Pet's
Identification, The Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 13, 1994, at 1C.
9 Id.
10 Large corporations such as Schering-Plough have become involved with the sales
and marketing of these devices. Destron/IDI Has Distribution Agreement with
Schering-Plough, PR Newswire, June 16, 1994, available in Lexis-Nexis Library,
News File. Interestingly, it has been predicted that "companies making electronic
detection devices will move quickly 'into the human market, because there's not
enough money in pets and livestock.'" Louv, supra note 1, at A2.
11 Avid, Trovan, and Destron are the three competing manufacturers. The questions
of which scanners are able to accurately read which chips is disputed. Siino, supra
note 6, at 24.
12 Id.
13 Jon Van, In Future, Tiny Chip May Get Under Skin, Chicago Tribune, May 7,
1996, at 1.
14 Medical researchers are also currently "developing a system in which a microchip
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for identification has already been developed for use, e.g., on a tag
outside the body. 15 Dallas Semiconductor is marketing a Touch
Memory Button microchip with information to be read by a
scanner.16 Potential uses include employee identification. 17
Also, SmartDevice, a microchip manufactured by a subsidiary of
Hughes Aircraft Co., 18 has been described as follows: 19
The chip is a passive transponder, without any power source,
which has meant it can be kept very small. The information
is non volatile and can be activated by low frequency radio
waves and so read in a manner not unlike the reading of bar
coded items. It... is an application-specific integrated
circuit. The code is burned in a [sic] the time of
manufacture. It has a non-magnetic, ferrite core and a
copper antenna and is encased in biocompatible glass and as
it is so small it can pass through the bore of a needle to be
inserted.
The SmartDevice is being placed within the Trilucent Adjustable Breast
Implant, by LipoMatrix, Inc.20 to "include device manufacturing data,
device performance data and to facilitate periodic information updates
regarding device status, adverse event reporting and post-market
implanted on the retina feeds visual information through to the brain." For those
blinded due to retinal deficiencies, the chips will aid vision by passing signals received
in response to light to human nerve cells. Carl Franklin, Chip Gives Sight To The
Blind, Sunday Times, Feb. 26, 1995.
15 Information has been released on an externally applied suitable device for
employee identification. Scott Liebs, Data? Look for The Button - Dallas
Semiconductors miniature device finds a range of applications, Information Week,
Aug. 1, 1994, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File.
16 The new device has already been sold to the U.S Postal Service for attachment on
mailboxes to improve collection schedules and to Ryder Systems Inc. to gauge
mileage on trucks. Id.
17 Id.
18 Kathleen Wiegner, In Development: The Cutting Edge: Computing/Techno-
logy/Innovation; Giving Surgical Implants IDs, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 17, 1994, at
5.
19 The microchip is encased in a very strong glass. A force strong enough to shatter
the casing, the blow would kill the person. Chips With Everything! LipoMatrix's
Processor in Breast Implants to LipoMatrix's Patient-Tracking, Computergram
International, Sept. 9, 1994, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File [hereinafter
Chips With Everything..
20 The breast implant is made out of a soybean oil derivative. Because saline and
silicon gel filled implants interfere with mammography, this new filler was
LipoMatrix's solution to interference. Clinical Trials of Triglyceride-Filled Breast
Implant To Be Conducted; Device May Improve Mammography, Pr Newswire,
Aug. 1, 1994, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File [hereinafter Clinical
Trials].
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surveillance." 2 1 Clinical trials have already begun in Europe22 and are
about to begin in the U.S.2 3 An investigational device exemption has
been granted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).24 If the
device is approved, it would not be difficult to envisage a facile
transition to SmartDevice or a similar microchip being implanted into
humans alone.
In fact, steps in that direction have already been made. According
to one source, Hughes Aircraft has submitted a read-write device for
carrying a person's medical history for FDA approval.2 5 Alhough the
device can be read from only about a foot away, with the addition of a
battery, it could be read at greater distances.2 6
As mentioned, a patent discloses a microchip applied to the tooth
of a human or animal. 2 7 Identification is accomplished by scanning
the teeth.2 8 Thus, an internal, implanted microchip for identification
of humans is already a reality.
Also, IBM researchers are reportedly working on personal area
network technology (PAN) to transfer data stored in a human
implant. 29 Apparently, they are exploiting the salinity of the body to
create an electric field, by which data could be read. In this manner,
data could be exchanged between people, or verified by an external
mechanical system as a method of securing identification.
21 Id.
22 The following countries are conducting trials which begun in October 1993:
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Id. Additionally, Spain and France will
soon also be testing the device. Chips With Everything!, supra note 17.
23 Approximately 50 American women will participate in the study to be held at
such prestigious institutes as Johns Hopkins University Hospital in Baltimore, Md.
Clinical Trials, supra note 18.
24 Id.
25 Robert Ellis Smith, Implanting ID Microchips in Humans No Longer Far
Fetched, 20 Privacy J. 1 (1994). Currendy, according to a former Hughes employee,
'two doctors at Hughes Aircraft are now wearing the internal tags as a trial." Id. at 1.
26 Id.
27 U.S. Patent No. 5,037,301.
28 Id. Identification of missing children and criminals are envisaged uses of this
invention. Health information and other identifying information may also be
inscribed on the microchip according to the inventors.
29 Personal touch at your fingertips, The Sunday Star-Times, Dec. 8, 1996, at 5.
Such a device would allow a transfer of information between humans during a
handshake.
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Proposed Embodiments of the Implantable Microchip
Microchip devices might have three embodiments: read only, read-
write and read-write with tracking capabilities. 30
1. Read-Only
The simplest form of the device would have a read-only character,
similar to that now used in animals. Even this most basic form would
have numerous applications, for example, to identify Alzheimer's
patients, children and the unconscious. A broader use would be as a sort
of national identification card, based upon the identifying number
carried on the microchip.
However, there are objections to the use of any numbering system
for nationwide identification. The debate over the legality of national
identification cards is not new.3 1 A system of national identification
would entail a specific number for each person, a means for indicating
or recording the number, and a registry. The Social Security number
(SSN) is thought of as such an identifier. Technically it is not because
people may have more than one number or more than one person may
have the same number.3 2 Also, cards issued prior to 1971 were based
on information provided by individuals and not independently
30 A fourth embodiment is conceivable, though technologically somewhat far from
implementation. The possibility of using a microchip implant inserted into the brain
to control a human's thoughts and/or actions has been discussed by scientists. One
scientist "believes it is realistic to envisage a time when microchips can be attached to
the living circuits of the brain to augment memory and intellectual prowess." Simon
Davies, Bionic Man Comes of Age, The Times, Oct. 17, 1994. Another scientist
speaking on the ethical implications of such a device said "[t]here is a risk that the
mind could be controlled externally." Id. The British Medical Association has
recently begun to examine the ethical implications of intelligent implants. Id. Active
implants which have their own internal electronics which can respond directly to
neural interconnectivity have also been envisaged by others. Geoff Metcalf, Midnight
Radio: Geoff Metcalf interviews Charles Ostman, Mondo 2000, Indian Summer
1996, at 14, 17. This technology is currently undeveloped and will not be treated.
31 Eric Grossman, Comment, Conceptualizing National Identification:
Information Privacy Rights Protected, 19 J. Marshal L. Rev. 1007 (1986). The
impact of a national identification card on an individual's right of informational
privacy has been described in terms of a balancing act between public interest and
probability of harm to the individual. However, in this Comment the author
concluded that "[a] national identifier does not infringe informational privacy per se
because there is not personal information in the number itself. "
32 Trudy Hayden & Jack Novik, Your Rights To Privacy 100 (1980). Additionally,
the safeguards required for the SSN to be a universal identifier are not in place i.e.,
internal check features to prevent falsification and to prevent reuse of the number after
a person's death.
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verified. 3 3 Moreover, the system now in place, which requires
underlying documents for verification before a SSN is issued, is also
subject to fraud because of "the ease of obtaining fraudulent underlying
documents (breeder documents) such as birth certificates and driver's
licenses." 3 4 Thus, the SSN is not entirely suitable for a national
identification card.
Alternatives that encode certain physical characteristics numerically
may be employed instead. Biometric identifiers are preferable because
they contain an inherent validation mechanisms. If the identifier is
merely a random number, it only has meaning when connected to an
individual. By contrast, a biometric identifier representing a particular
human characteristic may be clearly matched to an individual. 3 5 One
possiblity is the numerical expression for the unique contours of an
individual's iris.
3 6
33 In a statement made by Dr. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security
before the House Committee on Governmental Reform and Oversight, Mar. 7, 1995,
she indicated that the General Accounting Office "concluded that the card would not
be a good identifier because it does not satisfy three criteria for a reliable identity
document." A reliable document would be "difficult to counterfeit; allow verification
that the person presenting the document is, in fact, the individual to whom it was
issued; and be difficult to obtain fraudulently." She also estimated that the cost of
making the Social Security card more secure would be $3-6 billion.
34 Because the breeder documents are themselves subject to fraud by counterfeiting,
the use of the Social Security numbers (SSNs) as accurate identifiers is undesirable,
according to testimony given by Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel for the
A.C.L.U. on Capitol Hill on Mar. 14, 1995. Testimony the same day by the
Commissioner of Social Security Dr. Shirley S. Chater also cast doubt on the utility
of the SSNr as an identifier. She indicated concerning the Death Master File, "we do
not verify most of the death reports which we receive from family members, funeral
directors, or postal authorities, nor do we verify death reports for people who are not
beneficiaries." So it is conceivable that an individual's death would not be reported to
the Social Security office, and that number could subsequently be conveyed to
another for identification purposes. Thus, the SSN has very large loopholes both in the
use of counterfeit breeder documents and in the continued fraudulent use of numbers
which should be decommissioned due to death, which allow for deception in
identification and make it a poor universal identifier.
35 An example of a biometric identifier is the fingerprint. The Comparator Systems
Corp. has developed a Fingerprint Identification System (utilizing software and
scanners) to be used on a national identification card for an unspecified foreign
country. Business Wire, Mar. 6, 1995, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File.
36 U.S. Patent No. 5,291,560. By this technique, a reference code for an individual
is first established. Subsequently, the reference code for a particular individual is
compared to the code obtained for the iris imaged. Using statistical calculations which
compensate for variations in pupil dilation, the degree of similarity is established. A
very close correlation will confirm that the reference code and the present image were
taken from the same individual. Id.
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Aside from the difficulties involved with the assignment of a
reference number for each individual, other concerns came to light
when a system for country-wide identification purposes was proposed
in Australia. 37 Among the problematic issues in the introduction and
regulation of a national identification card in Australia were: inaccurate,
incomplete, irrelevant or misleading data and unauthorized disclosure
of personal data. 38 Concerns that "[o]nce the system is established, it
will be virtually impossible to resist demands to make it available to a
wider and wider range of agencies" were voiced.3 9 The most serious
overtone, however, was that "requiring each citizen to carry a
government number is another step along the path of treating people as
a 'national resource', which means government property, whereas the
liberal democratic view has always been that the government is the
people's 'property' ,,40
A system has also been advanced for U.S. worker verification, 4 1 in
part to combat illegal immigration. To that end, President Clinton has
asked for a $1 billion budget for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to control illegal immigration. 42 Approximately $28M of that
money has been allocated for a worker verification system,4 3 in
response to pressures from Congressional representatives for action.
37 See, Law Society opposes Australia Card, Law Soc'y J., June 1986, at 32.
38 The government had proposed that a registry linking the ID number to specific
information be kept for each citizen. Adam Marshall, The 'Australia Card" A Survey
of the Privacy Problems Arising from the Proposed Introduction of an Australian
Identity Card,2 J.L. & Info. Sci., 111, 113-115 (1986).
39 Geoffrey de Q. Walker, Information as Power: Constitutional Implications of
the Identity Numbering and I1D Card Proposal, Queensland L. Soc'yJ., June 1986,
at 153, 158. A governmental committee was formed to determine the structure for a
"national identification numbering system." The card was to be required for financial
transactions, obtaining employment, and transfer of real estate among others. In a
chilling commentary which indicates that the government was aware of the extensive
intrusion of individual's privacy, it was stated that "[i]t will be important to minimize
[sic] any adverse public reaction to implementation of the system. One possibility
would be to use a staged approach for implementation, whereby only less sensitive
data are held in the system initially with the facility to input additional data at a later
stage...." Id. at 159.
40 Id. at 163.
41 Alan K Simpson, That's not the Idea, The Plain Dealer, Aug. 15, 1994, at 9B.
42 "The INS's budget went up 25 percent from 1994 to 1995, and under the
president's proposal it would go up another 24 percent." Susan R. Kneller, Daily
Labor Rep., Feb. 7, 1995, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File.
4 3 Id.
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Barbara Jordan called for a "simpler more fraud-resistant system for
verifying authorization to work" in a speech to the Senate Immigration
Subcommittee in 1994. 4 4 California Proposition 187 to decrease
services for illegal immigrants has been approved. In conjunction,
Governor Wilson has suggested that "all legal California residents carry
a tamper-proof identity card." 4 5 However, opponents have intimated
that the use of the system would not solve the problem but would
worsen the situation by forcing the undocumented workers "into the
underground market and into more dangerous or less secure jobs." 46
Others have also expressed interest. A Republican proposal includes
"a tamper-resistant Social Security card that would have to be produced
when someone applies for a job but at no other time." 47 Still others
recommend updating and completing Social Security Administration
and Immigration and Naturalization Service databases .48 These are
steps towards creation of a worker verification database.
Problems with the introduction of a national identification card in
the U.S. would be similar to those related previously in conjunction
with the Australian system. Further problems revolve around the
privacy implications connected with the maintenance of a large
database or registry to connect the identifier to actual information.
4 9
44 Id. As chair of the congressional Commission on Immigration Reform, Jordan's
speech was to recommend methods to deter illegal immigration. Senator Simpson
argues that the system called for is not a national ID card because it would not have to
be routinely carried and produced to officials. Instead it "would be presented only at
the time of new-hire employment, or at the time of application for federally funded
benefits, including health care." Id. See also Immigration Reform: Can a Central
Data Bank Detect Illegal Aliens Without Trampling Civil Liberties? A.B.A.J., Nov.
1994, at 44, 45.
45 George de Lama, Candidates Backing Proposition 187 Could Get Burned,
Chicago Tribune, Oct. 28, 1994, at 1.
46 Scott Hodge, Big Brothers LD. Card Better Yet, Why Not Just Brand Babies?
Los Angeles DailyJournal, July 2, 1990, at 6.
47 Gil Klein, National ID Seen As Way To Screen Illegal Workers, Tampa Tribune,
Dec. 31, 1994, at 1. It was also proposed that the card have a magnetic code, which
would be read to verify whether or not the individual carrying that card had the legal
right to work. Id.
48 Robert Suro, Workplace May Be Focus of Immigration Control; White House
Officials Consider Programs That Could Spawn Computerized National Registry,
Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1995, at All. On Jan. 24, 1995 at his State of the Union
address, the President announced his approval for this immigration policy. It is
apparent that the registry will only be useful if individuals are required to carry some
identification to link them to the updated database. Id.
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When a computer is used to search for all the data on many different
databases concerning a person as listed by his identifier (computer-
matching), there is an increased risk of intrusion into personal privacy,
especially where the information can be obtained by or disseminated to
many others. Obviously, the use of a microchip implant would serve the
purpose of a tamper-resistant 50 identification card, but it would also
be connected to a computer-based registry to access desired
information about an individual. Thus, the difficulties described above
related to computer-matching will also be relevant. It is evident that the
issue of what identifier the microchip will be coded with must be
addressed before the microchip implant can effectively serve as a
national identifier in the U.S.
2. Read-write
Another form of the microchip implant could be a read-write
device. This type of microchip would be capable of carrying a set of
information which could be expanded as necessary. That is so because
this type of device allows the storage of variable data, and is
programmable at a distance. 5 1 For example, if the microchip were to
carry a person's medical history, as that history evolved the subsequent
information could also be added to the microchip without the necessity
of removing the implanted chip. 52 While the use of such a chip in this
49 See, e.g., John Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification
Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 Hastings L. J.
991 (1984), Jonathan P. Graham, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial
Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1395 (1987), Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977) (State of New York's desire to have the names and addresses of
all people who filled certain classes of prescription drugs which could have legal or
illegal uses ruled to be a reasonable exercise of the State's broad police powers). But
see, John Doe v. City of New York, 15 F. 3d 264 (2nd Cir. 1994) (regarding a press
release concerning conciliatory agreement revealed that individual had AIDS, the
court stated that he had a constitutional right to privacy regarding his medical
condition).
50 The implant is not completely tamper-free because there is a possibility that the
microchip could be excised, and replaced with a microchip with manipulated data.
51 An RF transmitter forming part of a read/write device is generally used to radiate
an electromagnetic field via an antenna. When the chip enters this field, the detection
microchip receives energy from the RF field and begins transmitting its stored
data.... In return, it is possible with read/write systems, to modulate the RF
transmitter, and to transmit data to the detection microchip over a distance. U.S.
Patent No. 5,218,343.
52 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 23, where a read/write device is under current
evaluation and also Bill Hart, Big Brother's Watching... the Family Pet, Phoenix
Gazette, July 24, 1994, at G1. Charles Jenkins, a Phoenix psychologist is reportedly
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capacity might require the encoding of an enormous amount of data,
scientists continue to develop chips which are equal to the task.53
The need for instantaneous access to the medical records of
individuals has been expressed by President Clinton as a part of his
universal health care coverage plan.54 Therefore, the development of a
microchip implant as a read-write device to carry medical information
has already begun 5 5, and already has a potential application.
This however, is not the only purpose that a read-write microchip
implant could serve. It could also facilitate and record financial
transactions. Many credit card companies are already working to
develop Smart Card technology, using chip-based payment products
which are projected to reduce both fraud and transaction processing
costs. 5 6 Another example of the interest in a device with read-write
capabilities is the Australian proposal for a national identification card
which mandated compulsory production of the card in the following
situations: investment, land transactions, deposits at financial institutes,
social security benefits, and dealings in futures contracts. 57 It is
evident that microchips do have utility for recording financial
transactions. Moreover, if the credit card companies employed a
microchip implant, instead of the current external Smart Card under
development, the opportunity for loss or falsification would be even
more drastically reduced.
close to marketing a microchip implant containing a medical profile to aid paramedics
at the sites of disasters.
5 Scientists have already described microchips capable of holding a billion bits of
information, and predict that within the next twenty years chips which hold a trillion
bits of information will be available. Gary Stix, Toward "Point One , Sci. Am., Feb.
1995, at 90.
54 The connection between a universal health card and a national ID card is close
because one could easily be adapted for the purposes of the other. Charles Oliver, Do
We Need a National ID Card? Investor's Business Daily, Aug. 12, 1994, at 1.
55 See, e.g., supra note 23.
56 Mastercard Will Support Smart Card Technology, EFT Report, Aug. 3, 1994,
available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File. The program should be phased in by the
end of the year 2000 and is expected to save more than $3 billion worldwide. The
changeover involves cards containing the chips and terminals to read the new cards.
57 Graham Greenleaf, The Australia Card: Towards a National Surveillance
System, Law Soc'y J., Oct. 1987 at 24, 25. The same article also reveals that "[e]very
person in Australia will be required to obtain a Card, induding children. The Bill does
not make it legally compulsory: it simply makes it impossible for anyone to exist in
Australian society without it because they will be unable to carry out normal
activities.., such as operation of bank accounts."
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The third important set of information that a read-write microchip
could carry would be criminal records. If one were to apply for a job,
employers could readily possible criminal convictions. This might be
particularly important for sensitive positions such as security guards, bus
drivers, or day care workers. 58 Additionally, if a police officer made a
routine traffic stop, the individual could be quickly "scanned" to see if
he had a nefarious background.
Other potential applications could also be envisaged. The use of
read-write capabilities of the microchip would enable an airline
passenger to fly without purchasing a ticket. Upon sale, the information
that the purchase had been made could be imprinted on the chip. Later
at the airport, instead of asking for a ticket, the stewardess would
merely scan the individual to insure that they had paid for travel, and
were taking the correct flight. This would serve a dual purpose in the
case where the chip carried information about criminal records.
Subversives, known terrorists or wanted criminals could quickly be
identified before their departure and be prevented from boarding.59
Moreover, another commercial application would be to aid in toll
collections. The implantable microchip might replace the traditional
coin-operated highway toll system. Instead of paying as one drives
through the booth, one would be scanned, and a bill would be posted
to the driver's account. Prototypes of electronic toll systems are
currently undergoing testing.6 0 Because of the multitude of
applications, this type of read-write microchip would generate both
commercial and governmental interest.
58 The utility of the device would be obvious, but the question would then become
how much information to include. For instance, if the microchip only contains
information on convictions, it would not be as helpful as a record of all arrests. As
more and more information is stored, the intrusion on personal privacy is
correspondingly increased.
59 Jonathan Lewis Miller, Search and Seizure of Air Passengers and Pilots: The
Fourth Amendment Takes Flight, 22 Transp. L. J. 199, 200 (1994). The usual
searches conducted at airports reveal only drugs or firearms. However, "[ilt would
technically be possible to implant felons with microchips via hypodermic injections,
which would announce their status as felons as they passed through airport arrival and
departure gates." Id. at 200.
60 A system currently undergoing testing in six states is a pre-paid tag placed on a
vehicle which can be read by overhead antennas on the toll booth. For Whom the
Tolls Swell: Electronic Toll Systems Promise Big Growth, The Wall St. J., Sept. 8,
1994, at 1.
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3. Read-write and Tracking
In addition to the read-write capabilities described above, a device
can also emit a radio signal which could be tracked. Applications would
again be numerous as evidenced by the less advanced technologies
already in existence. An electronic tethering system is used in some
jurisdictions as a pre-trial detention monitor. 6 1 An ankle bracelet
monitors a subject to ensure that he remains within his home. If the
device is removed, or the subject is more than 50 feet from the receiver
(telephone) it should transmit a signal to police. 62 If a microchip
implant had tracking capabilities, it would be superior to the currently
available electronic tether because it would not require the telephone as
an adjunct. For the tether system to work properly, no one can use the
phone for extended periods, and line failure can interrupt
monitoring.63
With a microchip implant, constant monitoring would be possible.
If each chip emitted a signal of a unique identifying frequency,
implanted individuals could be tracked by simply dialing up the correct
signal. The implantable microchip could be monitored from the police
station, a car or perhaps even a helicopter, in contrast to the current
tethering device, which only works if the tagged individual remains
close to the monitoring unit in his home. Because the receiver is mobile,
the tagged individual can be tracked anywhere.
Such devices could also be used to keep a building secure, by
providing information as to who is in what portion of a building.
Some analogous devices are now used by biomedical researchers to
track animals. Microprocessor-based implantable telemetry systems
have been developed which require batteries for power to emit
signals. 64 However, batteries present problems due to their lifetimes
61 United States v. Cashin, 739 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
62 The device can be programmed to monitor the subject as frequently as every 30
seconds. Once the subject is out of the range of the receiver, a warning may be
sounded, but the bracelet cannot then be used further to track the subject's
movements. Id. at 1108.
63 If some interference with the telephone line occurs, the warning signal of that
event may not be received until between 30 minutes to four hours later. For that
reason, the system is somewhat limited in scope. Id.
64 A flexible system which can be programmed for a variety of short-term
experiments has been described. Kenneth W. Fernald et al., A Microprocessor-Based
implantable Telemetry System, Computer, Mar. 1991, at 23.
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and weight. 65 These problems need to be addressed for implantable
microchips to have such capabilities. 6
6
Post-Implantation Detection Avoidance
For several uses, such as encoding criminal records, persons
implanted would find it undesirable that that information be readily
available. As quickly as technology for implantation can spring up,
evasive techniques can be developed. For example, one might wear
certain clothing to block signals or even have the implant removed.
Equipment might be developed which could be held up to the body to
decommission the device.
If only criminals had implants, the result would be that criminals
would suddenly appear as law abiding citizens. 67 A requirement that
everyone be implanted would circumvent such problems.6 8 Cloaking
would be the most rudimentary method of deception. It would be
much more difficult to replace a correct chip with a counterfeit. Strict
controls and secrecy of manufacture would be imposed to prevent
thiss.69 Even if the implant carried only work verification or medical
information, mandatory implantation is still needed.70
65 Id.
66 Interestingly, A. F. Westin has suggested a solution to this problem. "However, it
is possible that low-level electrical charges generated within the body or other bodily
power sources, such as body heat or pressure changes, might be harnessed to provide
the operating energy." Westin, supra note 2 at 86.
67 The same would apply for the situation in which the microchip contained
information on medical history. Some might be motivated to remove evidences of
psychological instability which might be encoded. Also, if one were suing for injuries
obtained, they may not want an easily accessible record which might indicate that that
injury was actually a pre-existing condition.
68 This conclusion has been drawn as a result of interviews with experts in the
industry who attest to the veracity of the concept of necessitated universal
implantation.
69 In addition to controls of manufacturing, there would probably be secrecy
surrounding the encoding of the information and the receivers or scanners to read the
microchips. Additionally, as with certain key components of the manufacture of
drugs, the necessary materials to make the microchip would be closely monitored.
Also, the government would probably employ some sort of electronic signature,
similar to the watermark on currency, to make duplication extremely difficult. Thus,
the multiplicity of obstacles to overcome would effectively prevent counterfeiting by
implantation of microchips bearing false information.
70 This is so because otherwise undesirable information could relatively easily be
blocked. For example, if only those with serious diseases that are also contagious such
as AIDS are required to have a microchip implant, someone who does not want that
information to be known could simply block it as described in the text. With the
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We will therefore presume that, for microchips to have broad
utility, they must be mandatorily implanted. Commercial uses
involving consensual implantation, 7 1 or voluntary implantation for
government record-keeping purposes would be far less effective. Below,
the ramifications of mandatory governmentally-imposed implantation
will be viewed from the perspectives of common law, constitutional and
property rights.
Rights Infringed by Microchip Implants
Common Law
The right to privacy may be inferred from the language of the First,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. It has also been established
through common law. precedents. 7 2 As early as 1891, Justice Gray of
the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that "[n]o right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law."7 3 Similar sentiments have been
echoed by Justice Cardozo in his famous statement that "[e]very
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
chip's information effectively silenced, the individual could appear to be disease free,
because he would have no scannable record. However, in the case of worker
verification, counterfeit chips would play a part, if only those eligible to work had
implants. To become "eligible" one need only have a counterfeit implant inserted. The
government would have to take steps to insure that the microchip was not readily
counterfeited. Thus, even if the microchip was only used to carry medical information
or worker verification information, the government would find administration of a
microchip implantation program simplest if all citizens were to be implanted.
71 If a parent wanted their child to be implanted for identification purposes in case
of kidnapping, one of the techniques described above could be easily used to nullify
their identity as indicated on the chip. If it were not mandatory for all children to
have the chip, it would be impossible to tell if the microchip had been removed or
altered.
72 Because these matters concern an individual's self-determination, they form part
of the right to privacy. Privacy involves "an interest in making certain kinds of
important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). In Whalen, the
objectionable government regulation was a requirement to keep centralized computer
files with names and addresses of those who ordered certain prescriptions.
73 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). A woman had been
injured in a train accident and was suing for negligence. A lower court had ordered
that she submit to a physical examination prior to the trial to determine the extent of
her injuries. The Supreme Court decided that the lower court had no power to subject
a party to a physical examination against her will. This was well before development of
rules for Civil Procedure. Id.
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what shall be done with his own body."'74 The right to privacy defined
by Justices Gray and Cardozo is a right to bodily integrity.7 5
One manifestation of that right is apparent in cases concerning the
terminally ill. These situations involve terminally ill adults who wish, or
whose relatives wish, to end their life. In Satz v. Perlmutter, a
competent terminally ill adult was allowed to decide to terminate life
support, based on his rights under the common law doctrine of bodily
integrity. 7 6 However, under the law of some states, a person in a
vegetative state must be demonstrated, with clear and convincing
evidence, to have earlier expressed a desire to terminate life support
under such circumstances before support can be removed. 77
A second manifestation in the common law of the right to bodily
integrity is the doctrine of informed consent. Though this doctrine
allows a pregnant woman to make informed choices for her life and the
life of her fetus, legal disputes have centered around the question of
whether or not the mother must submit to a Cesarean section to save
the life of her child, even if it is against her will.
An example of the use of the doctrine of informed consent is found
in In Re A.C., where a pregnant woman with terminal lung cancer was
forced by court order to have a Cesarean section. 78 Her difficulty in
breathing was damaging to the fetus, and doctors determined that a
Cesarean section would give the fetus a greater chance for survival,
74 According to this decision, if a surgeon operated on a patient without his consent,
it would be an assault. Schloendorffv. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129
(1914).
75 Dawn Johnsen, Symposium: Substance Use During Pregnancy: Legal and Social
Responses: Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing
Women s Liberty, 43 Hastings L. J. 569, 582 (1992).
76 Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). It was estimated
by his doctors that once the life supporting artificial respirator was removed, he would
live less than one hour.
77 Nancy Cruzan was critically injured in an automobile accident. She entered a
persistent vegetative state, kept alive by artificial feeding and hydration equipment
paid for by the State. Her parents petitioned to cease life-sustaining care, but the care
was not terminated because the Supreme Court of Missouri felt that clear and
convincing evidence of her wish not to be kept artificially alive (expressed in a
competent state) was missing. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
78 Despite apparent mootness due to the fact that the operation had been
performed, the Court of Appeals ruled on the case because of the basic dispute over
the right to make such decisions. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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though she never acquiesced to the surgery. Unfortunately, two hours
after the court-ordered C-section the child died; the mother died two
days later. The Court of Appeals, in recognizing a right to bodily
integrity as illustrated by the right to accept or refuse medical
treatment, said that the woman's competent informed decision to not
have a C-section should have been honored. 7 9 The ability to refuse
invasive surgery and the ability to hasten death both stem from the
concept of bodily integrity.
To determine the legalities of policies affecting a person's bodily
integrity, courts often apply a balancing test whereby the weight of the
government's regulational objectives must be compared to the weight
of the individual's right to bodily integrity. The court in In Re A.C.
used this technique for "[i]n its analysis, the court balanced A.C.'s
interests of privacy and bodily integrity against the state's interest in the
potential life of the fetus, by comparing the chances of survival for
each." 80 Alternatively, it has been suggested that strict scrutiny is the
preferable test to determine whether or not a regulation or requirement
impinges upon an individual's right to bodily integrity since the issues
involved have such serious consequences. 8 1 Therefore, some have
suggested that the most rigorous of tests, requiring compelling
governmental interest and least restrictive means possible, must be
applied.
If the government mandated that all Americans be implanted with
microchips, it would be compelling an invasive procedure. Insertion
through a needle would not be complicated or delicate surgery, but it
would nonetheless interfere with bodily integrity. In addition to the
79 In 1994 another dispute about a court-ordered C-section over the mother's
objections arose in Chicago. The doctors felt that the fetus would not survive unless
delivered immediately surgically, but the mother refused to submit to the surgery,
protesting on religious grounds. The State wanted to appoint a guardian over the fetus
so that consent for perormance of a C-section could be obtained. The court decided
that based on the concept of bodily integrity and applying the principle of informed
consent, a woman had a right to refuse invasive medical treatment. Despite the
doctor's predictions otherwise, the child was born healthy in a natural delivery. In re
Baby Boy Doe, 260 IMI. App. 3d 392 (1994).
80 Annette Williams, Comment, In re A. C.: Foreshadowing the Unfortunate
Expansion of Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections, 74 Iowa L Rev. 287, 293 (1988).
81 Johnsen, supra note 63. "If the courts fail to apply strict scrutiny to adversarial
policies, the government will be free to override or penalize any decision by a woman
upon a simple showing that the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate interest
in reducing a risk to fetal development." Id. at 584.
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invasiveness of the initial surgery for implantation, the continuing
presence of the microchip within the individual must also be taken into
account. In combination with the surgery, the implant represents a
substantial permanent intrusion.
If a balancing analysis was used to determine whether one's rights to
bodily integrity were violated, the government would have persuasive
reasons for implantation due to the myriad of applications previously
described. 82 The numerous uses for microchip implants would
indicate that a great common good would indeed be served by their
use. Moreover, with regard to the degree of invasiveness, this
implantation does not require any in-depth surgical procedure, as in the
case of a Cesarean section.83
Yet, intrusion upon individual's rights must also be considered. The
element of continuous intrusion elevates the consideration from one of
how drastic the surgical procedure is, to a consideration which also
includes the long-term, continuous effects. The continuous intrusion
could tip the balance against the government's police powers.
84
If strict scrutiny analysis were employed, it would be even more
readily understood that implantation represented a clear violation of
individual rights. Ordinarily, this level of analysis is required only where
suspect classes are involved or where fundamental rights are being
regulated. Classification of the right to prevent foreign objects from
82 For criminals, the government generally exercises a more far-reaching control.
Thus the implantation of microchips does not result in as great a loss in the bodily
integrity rights of a criminal as it does for a law-abiding citizen. Johnsen, supra note
72, at 582.
83 The C-section may be considered to be a much more serious operation because
the body cavity must be opened, and general anesthetics are required. However, a
microchip implantation would be a much simpler procedure.
84 If Norplant, a contraceptive device which must be surgically implanted, is
mandated by the government, an analogous argument might apply. The use of
Norplant represents a continuous intrusion because as the device slowly releases
contraceptives for a period of up to five years unless surgically removed by a
sometimes complicated procedure. Julie Mertus & Simon Heller, Norplant Meets
The New Eugenicists: The Impermissibiity of Coerced Contraception, 11 St. Louis
U. Pub. L. Rev. 359, 360 (1992). Thus far, only a few cases have touched on this
subject. See, e.g., In re: Lacey, 189 W. Va. 580 (Ct. App. W.Va. 1993), and In re
S.S.J., 634 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Government has already expressed
an interest in at least encouraging the implantation by increasing welfare payments to
women who have the implant in proposed legislation. This could foreshadow a
mandate. Karin E. Wilinski, Involuntary Contraceptive Measures: Controlling
Women at the Expense of Human Rights, 10 B. U. Int'l L J. 351, 362 (1992).
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being placed in the body as a fundamental right is plausible, and will
trigger a strict scrutiny analysis. Although the compelling governmental
interest might be evident, microchip implantation is not the least
restrictive means to achieve objectives. Hence, mandatory implantation
would not be legal. 85 Thus, by either mode of analysis, implantation
could be precluded because of violation of rights to bodily integrity.
Constitutional Rights
Devices described above can be said to inmpinge upon various
constitutional rights, depending on the embodiment. Here we focus on
the relation of human microchip implantation to the Fourth and the
Fifth Amendments. 86 The Fourteenth Amendment will be discussed
in conjunction with the impingement upon property rights.
Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures. A type of search which has been frequently tested
for potential violation of constitutional rights is the use of electronic
surveillance. In that instance, a bifurcated framework has been used to
analyze which acts of surveillance constitute illegal searches. This
approach considers first the implications of the attachment of the
surveillance device and second the implications of continual monitoring
once a device is in place.87 These considerations must also take into
account the requirements of probable cause and particularity.88 There
must be a definite reason for suspicion necessitating the search, and the
search must also be placed within finite limits. In this section, a search
85 Requiring the carrying of I.D. cards, electronic tethers and even tattooing would
all be less intrusive options.
86 There is some indication that Article I Sec. 10 of the Constitution may be
applicable. In 1980, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling that struck
down a Louisiana law which required itinerant workers to obtain identifcation cards.
Because the scheme in question would interfere with free movement of labor across
state lines, the law was invalidated. David Ranii, ID Cards For Laborers Ruled
Illegal, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 10, 1980, at 4.
87 The Ninth Circuit has used this analytical approach, but holds that the use of a
beeper to follow an automobile or an airplane is not a search within the Fourth
Amendment. United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1979).
88 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
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will first be defined, then the method of determination of whether or
not a search is constitutional will be explained, and finally the
applicability to microchip implantation will be explored.
The courts often examine whether or not the activity under
surveillance normally has associated with it a legitimate expectation of
privacy in making their determinations as to whether or not a "search"
(requiring constitutional protection) took place. This factor may be
illustrated by a hypothetical surveillance of an individual walking on the
sidewalk. Privacy often has two aspects: 1) actual expectations and 2)
their reasonableness. 89 Applying these to the hypothetical, just because
a pedestrian thinks sidewalk activities are private and precluded from
surveillance does not mean that they are. Legally, because of no
reasonable expectation of privacy on a sidewalk, observing the
pedestrian does not amount to a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes.
The same type of question has been asked in litigation over whether
or not surveillance of a moving automobile is a search. If a beeper is
placed on an automobile for tracking, is it within the realm of public
activities and therefore a type of surveillance which is not a search?
Courts have answered that question in the affirmative, terming driving
an activity associated with a "diminished expectation of privacy," not a
search because "[a] car has little capacity for escaping public
scrutiny," 9 0 The same reasoning has also been applied to beepers
placed on airplanes, 9 1 and the use of infrared devices to examine the
heat content emanating from buildings. 92
89 A beeper had been placed on a container of chloroform that was sold to an
individual suspected of using the chemical to manufacture illegal drugs. Because the
moving of the drum by the suspect outdoors was an activity with no reasonable
expectation of privacy, the use of a beeper was not ruled to be a search. United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983).
90 Id. at 281 (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
91 Placement of a beeper on an airplane was not a search because in that instance,
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Planes are constantly monitored as to
their positions, heights and altitudes already, so a flying plane is a scrutinizable activity
that is not a search. United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1979).
92 The devices are forward looking infrared devices used to detect differences in
surface temperature. These instruments can be used by police to determine whether or
not marijuana is grown inside a structure, because the extra lighting necessary to grow
marijuana plants generates a high amount of heat. See, e.g., United States v. Pinson,
24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Ford, No. 92-5181, 1994 WL
514580 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 1994).
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The generalized concepts relating to the definition of a search have
been related to external examples of beepers or wiretapping. However,
the Fourth Amendment has also been invoked with reference to internal
intrusions upon individuals to obtain evidence which could be used
against them. Examples include the withdrawal of blood and bodily
searches which require surgical procedures or other means to extract
substances from the body. In Winston v. Lee,9 3 a robber was shot
during an escape of the scene of an attempted robbery. Shortly
thereafter, a man with a gunshot wound was discovered in the vicinity.
To confirm that the suspect was connected with that particular robbery,
the police wanted to compel surgery to remove the bullet. Because of
the complicated and life-threatening surgery required to remove the
bullet, the Supreme Court ruled that the surgery would be an
unreasonable search. 94 Alternatively, other decisions have classified
these highly intrusive searches as warrantless searches rather than
unreasonable ones. 95 Thus, it seems that the courts are unwilling to
totally relinquish the power to conduct a highly intrusive search,
regardless of the conditions involved.
Arguments have also been made that taking blood samples is
another example of an internal search which may be said to implicate
the Fourth Amendment, where those samples indicate intoxication. 96
The same reasoning has been suggested as a reason to prevent the
collection of blood samples from convicted criminals to obtain DNA
for a genetic data bank.97 However, these arguments have not been
93 470 U.s. 753 (1985).
94 The surgical procedure to remove the bullet lodged in his chest was estimated to
carry a 1% chance of nerve damage and a 1/10% chance of death. Id. at 755.
95 A man was carrying illegal drugs. Upon obtaining a search warrant, the police
attempted to find the drugs by attempting a body cavity search, but the suspect was
uncooperative. Assuming that he had swallowed the drugs, they gave him laxatives to
recover the evidence. These were unsuccessful, so x-rays were taken which revealed
that an object was lodged in his stomach. Upon endoscopy, a surgical procedure, a
plastic bag filled with heroin was retrieved from his stomach. The court ruled that the
actions of the police to perform an endoscopy violated the suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights "because the endoscopy exceeded the scope of what any
reasonable police officer would believe to be authorized by the search warrant. United
States v. Nelson, No. 93-3628, 93-3848, 1994 WL 526111 (8th Cir. Sept. 29, 1994).
96 The reason for the blood test was that the petitioner was in an automobile
accident where it was suspected that he caused the accident due to his intoxication.
Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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successful against the claim that greater restraints on liberties are
required for the convicted.
Once it has been established that a search has indeed taken place, it
is thereafter unconstitutional only if a valid warrant was not obtained
prior to the search. The warrant is evidence that the proposed search has
been examined, and considered not to infringe upon the suspect's
rights. The leading case detailing the constitutionality of the search
when a warrant is provided is Katz v. United States, 98 which examined
the constitutionality of wiretap surveillance by the government. The
petitioner had been convicted based on improperly-obtained evidence
because the safeguard of first obtaining a search warrant before bugging
the phone booth had been ignored. On appeal the court stated that
"[i]n the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a
search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find
evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to
the least intrusive means consistent with that end." 99
The principles evolved for Fourth Amendment claims can be
applied to microchip implants. The clearest application will be to the
embodiment of the device that can read-write and track. Still, read
only and read-write devices also implicate Fourth Amendment
principles because, once installed, either could be scanned by police to
obtain information about the individual. Scanning of the microchip
would be considered as a search.
The first question to consider is whether or not a search (worthy of
Fourth Amendment protection) took place. Thus, scanning or
interrogation of the implanted microchip to obtain information from it
is the action to be evaluated. The act of implantation itself does not
constitute a search. 100 Rather, it is subsequent actions relating to the
garnering of information from the microchip which are of consequence
to the Fourth Amendment analysis.
97 See, e.g., Doe v. Gainer, No. 75806, 1994 WL 515549 (Ill. Sept. 22, 1994),
Gilbert v. Peters, No. 93 c 20012, 92 c 20354, 1994 WL 369643 (N.D. Ill. June 28,
1994), State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73 (1993), Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302
(1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992).
98 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (FBI agents attached an electronic listening device in a
phone booth where phone calls related to illegal gambling were made).
99 Id. at 356.
100 At the time of the installation, there is no motivation to recover or obtain
evidence. That is only possible later when the individual is tracked or scanned.
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In the case of any of the embodiments, an individual may have an
expectation of privacy as to the information on the microchip.
However, it would be more difficult to defend that expectation as a
justifiable one, if the microchip carried information of medical records
on a read-write device. 10 1 Because the information is vital for the good
of society, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. Proponents of
this theory would argue that such information was available and on
record already, and that this technology merely increased the speed
with which it could be recovered. If these arguments prevail, there
would be no search and no Fourth Amendment protection.
However, one court has found that personal information should be
kept private and not readily accessible. 10 2 In a Doe case, this
philosophy was validated for medical information by judges who
declared that "Doe has a right to privacy (or confidentiality) in his HIV
status, because his personal medical condition is a matter that he is
normally entitled to keep private." 103 Therefore, under Doe, retrieval
of information from a microchip read-write device is a search when the
information retrievable is of a type that is normally protected.
Monitoring a read-write device with tracking capabilities could be
defined as a search if the implanted citizen were law-abiding. Because
criminals have lesser privacy rights, tracking in their case wouldn't be
termed a search.10 4
Once it has been established that a search has occurred, the Fourth
Amendment protections insure that the search is only permissible under
certain conditions: that a warrant has been issued and that the search is
described with particularity. Even if it is a possibility that blanket
warrants could be issued, or that a warrant could be easily obtained, it
will be difficult to evade the particularity requirement of the Fourth
101 It may be in the vital interest of society to have access to the medical records if
they contained, e.g., information that someone had a contagious disease.
102 This argument is particularly suited to the case that the implant carries medical
records, but less so if the implant is to carry criminal records which are afforded less
protection.
103 In this case, his condition was revealed in a press release. Proponents of the
microchip implantation may argue that the information will only get into the hands of
a select few, such that this case is not governing. John Doe v. City of New York, 15
F.3d 264, 269 (2nd Cir. 1994).
104 Similar arguments have been used to justify the intrusive DNA sampling of
criminals to create genetic data banks.
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Amendment with reference to microchip implantation. That
requirement is to prevent an overbroad search which impinges on an
individual's privacy rights. 10 5
If the embodiment of the device is read only or read-write, the
particularity requirement could be satisfied with a warrant. Conversely,
if the device was read-write with tracking capabilities, the search would
not be defined with particularity, as a person could be monitored at any
time, in any place. 10 6 In summation, in any form, interrogation of the
microchip implant can be considered a search under the bifurcated
analytical framework. The Fourth Amendment protections to make a
search constitutional could conceivably be met by the government when
the search involves certain information from read only or read-write
devices. However, if the device is used for tracking purposes, it will fail
the particularity test and thus violate the Fourth Amendment on the
grounds that a valid warrant has not been issued.
Ffih Amendment
The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that no citizen "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."1 0 7
Verbal self-incrimination is commonly understood to be covered by the
amendment, 10 8 but it has also been applied to removal of objects from
someone's body.109 "[A] person is compelled to be a witness against
105 The Particularity Clause has recently been examined in relationship to the
proposed use of the Clipper scheme. For the protection of data there are currently a
number of methods for scrambling the data (encryption). Only authorized users are
then able to read the data. The government has proposed that only one encryption
method be utilized, the Clipper scheme, so that they will effectively be able to read
any information from any source. It has been proposed that the Clipper scheme
violates the Fourth Amendment because it would allow an essentially continuous
review of data in an unlimited fashion. Mark I. Koffsky, Comment, Choppy Waters
in the Surveillance Data Stream: The Clipper Scheme and the Particularity Clause, 9
High Tech. L.J. 131 (1994).
106 Each microchip might be on its own particular frequency, which would enable
police to "tune in" to anyone they might wish to track.
107 U. S. Const. amend. V.
108 In addition, the use of beepers for surveillance has been said to have Fifth
Amendment implications. "The government, by a trespass minimal in the physical
sense, causes the unwitting suspect to become a reporter to the government of
information incriminating to himself." United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 271
(5th Cir. 1981).
109 In one instance, a man swallowed pills suspected to be illegal drugs. The police
forced him to take an emetic to recover the evidence. The court ruled that the
evidence obtained by the forced vomiting violated the suspect's constitutional rights.
Ramesh: Time Enough? 397
himself not only when he is compelled to testify, but also when...
incriminating evidence is forcibly taken from him by a contrivance of
modern science" according to a concurrence by Justice Black.11 0
Non-verbal communications are not as easily categorized. For
example, in a case concerning whether or not blood withdrawn from a
suspect could be used to prove intoxication, the court commented that
"[s]ince the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of
compulsion, wfs neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to
some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not
inadmissible on privilege grounds." 1 11 Yet later in the same opinion,
Justice Brennan tempered the decision in the following manner: "That
we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor
intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited
conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." 112 Thus, there appears
to be some disagreement as to the extent of the reach of the Fifth
Amendment's protection as applied to bodily intrusions. However, a
common theme in such cases is that the courts examine the difficulty
involved in terms of the level of intrusiveness required to obtain the
"non-verbal communication," to determine whether it is constitutional.
The Fifth Amendment could be applied to the use of microchip
implants in humans because it could be a form of self-incrimination
where the device has tracking capabilities. 113 Note that the
implantation itself would not be incriminating, but the scanning or
tracking of the implant could be. The question which arises is whether
or not the act of carrying the implant is self-incrimination. According
to decisions which require a communicative act such as speech or
writing, the implant would not be an example of self-incrimination
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
110 Id at 173 (Black, J., concurring).
I11 The court held that only communicative testimonials were protected by the Fifth
Amendment, and withdrawal of blood did not qualify as such. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
112 Id. at 771.
113 If the device is read only or read/write, it would be much more difficult to relate
the device to the concept of self-incrimination. If the device were read/write and
contained a criminal history or history of mental illness, there might be some
intersection with Fifth Amendment principles. See also supra note 64.
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worthy of Fifth Amendment protection. Yet the carrying of the
implant might properly be categorized as a communicative act because
the chip would provide for constant communication of location. If the
government has the ability to determine where someone is at all times,
that information could be used as evidence in the commission of certain
crimes. It would be analogous to the situation in which a suspect wore a
beeper for surveillance 24 hours a day for the rest of his life. 1 14 In that
instance, it might be most properly characterized as self-incrimination
and therefore prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Conversely, if the
implantation were consensual, it could hardly be said to represent self-
incrimination because of acquiescence.
Moreover, if tracking or scanning of the microchip is considered
merely as a non-verbal communication, it may not qualify for Fifth
Amendment immunity if constitutionally obtained. Since the act of
scanning or tracking does not involve any life-threatening operation, or
serious physical disruption, but rather only the monitoring of an
electronic device, it would not be intrusive enough a method to qualify
for immunity.
Property Rights
Property rights are protected from governmental deprivation
without due process by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 1
5
Here, we focus on the latter. To determine what is protected by the
due process clauses, it is necessary to understand what is meant by the
term "property." This is constantly refined and expanded by the courts,
but basically it refers to a collection of rights held in a particular
object.11 6 They may be tangible, as in the case of land or possessions, or
intangible, as in the case of intellectual property. Property has been
defined as "every species of valuable right and interest" which may be
protected by the State. 1 17 Although the concept of one's own body as
114 This possibility was foreshadowed by Justice Rehinquist, but disregarded as
technologically unlikely. See supra note 4.
115 The Fourteenth Amendment reads: "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." The Fifth, applicable to the
federal government reads similarly.
116 Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing
Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 207,
213 (1986).
117 In the same paragraph, the author also explains that the term "property" is
purposefully vague so that the courts can interpret it as modern life evolves. Id.
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one's property has not been embraced by the courts, there is some
precedent for that expansion. The law does not provide an overtly
obvious method of insulation from bodily intrusions such as mandatory
microchip implantation, but it is argued that novel situations require
novel applications and expansions of existing legal concepts.
Here, the current rationale for and against the definition of the
body as property will be examined, followed by current indications that
the theory should be generally adopted. Last, the application of the
concept of the body as property to the use of microchip implantation
into humans will be explained.
1. Rationale
As explained, the concept of the human body as property is not
generally accepted. One reason is fear that if the body were property,
one could sell oneself or a portion thereof to another for profit. The
basic rights in property include the right to transfer it as one wishes. 118
However, those fears could be allayed by specific statutes covering and
limiting transfers. Even the transfer of land is subject to, e.g., zoning
restrictions.1 19 Another reason for hesitation to consider the body as
property is that it harkens back to slavery.
If the body were recognized as property, it would provide certain
advantages. Namely, the Fourteenth Amendment which insures that
the individual will not be deprived of property without due process of
law could then be invoked against intrusions into an individual's body.
It may be argued however, that the individual is already afforded
Fourteenth Amendment protection through the liberty aspect of the
amendment. 120 Liberty is generally thought to refer to personal rights
in conjunction with torts such as battery, assault and false
imprisonment. 12 1 These may be categorized as external events, ones
(quoting Susan Rose-Acherman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 931 (1985)).
118 The ability to transfer the property is alienability. It has been pointed out that
merely because an item is property does not mean it must be fully alienable without
restriction. Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, Hastings Center Report,
Oct.1986, at 28, 29.
119 For instance, a law might be passed which would allow transfer of organs or body
parts, as long as it is not for valuable consideration. This would decrease the possibility
that a person would be tempted to damage himself for monetary gain. Id. at 33.
120 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
121 In this note, it is argued that one can have property rights in one's own body. Erik
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which are not the doing of the individual himself, but rather the acts of
another against the self. Conversely, property rights in one's own body
would cover the acts of the self concerning the self. Therefore the
liberty interest does not strictly apply, and the property interest in the
self could result in a right distinct from the liberty interest. The
importance of this feature will be illustrated below.
Current Indications
Evidence for some situations in which the body has been considered
as property, or at least as quasi-property, can be found in statutes and
court decisions. For example, individuals can have limited rights with
respect to the corpse of another, referred to as quasi-property rights. 122
Surviving spouses often have the ability to determine how to dispose of
the dead. 12 3 Other rights in an individual's body are defined by the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) which determines how and to
whom gifts of transplantable organs can be made subsequent to the
death of a donor.12 4 Since one of the rights attached to property is the
ability to alienate it, the introduction of the UAGA serves as evidence
that it is permissible to have property rights in one's body,12 5 though
they are statutorily limited. 1
26
In York v. Jones, a couple had an embryo cryogenically frozen for
future use. 12 7 Later, they wished to transfer it from an in-vitro
S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes" Assessing the Nonconsensual
Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 528, 554 (1990).
122 These property rights are very limited, and are generally only concerned with
burial. Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation For Tissues And Cells Used
In Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 628, 631 (1989).
123 The Note cites cases where this right has been given to the widow. Id.
124 All 50 states have adopted the Act in whole or in part. Among the stipulations of
the Act are: definition of the scope of legal donations, rules on how determination of
donation may be made by next of kin, and to whom donations may be given as well
as for what purposes. Jaffe, supra note 121, at 532.
125 Note that though these concepts pertain only to dead bodies and not to the
living, whatever rights are afforded to the dead should be available in even greater
portion to the living, since they are in much greater need of protection.
126 This argument has been propounded by the dissent in the case Moore v. Regents
of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 154 (1990).
127 The couple had been receiving fertility treatments for a number of years. Six eggs
were removed from Mrs. York and fertilized. The dispute centered around a
cryogenically frozen embryo that was left over after an unsuccessful implantation of
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fertilization institute in Virginia to another in California. The Virginia
institute refused, citing the Cryopreservation agreement signed by the
couple which specified only one of three fates for cryopreserved
embryos. Interinstitutional transfer was not one agreed upon. The
Yorks' argument, adopted by the court, was that the Cryopreservation
Agreement was an admission by the Institute that the Yorks had
property rights in addition to contract rights in the embryos. 12 8 Thus,
within the confines of a contract, the court was willing to recognize
property rights in an embryo.
In a later dispute over the ownership of frozen embryos, another
court was not as willing to go as far. 12 9 The Davises had seven in-vitro
fertilized embryos stored at a clinic for later implantation. Afterwards,
in divorce proceedings they disagreed over who should get the
embryos. Finding it impossible to call the embryos "persons", and
unwilling to call them "property", the court compromised by putting
them in an "interim category that entitles them to special respect
because of their potential for human life." 13 0 The rights or duties
entailed by the interim category were not further elaborated upon other
than to indicate that the interest of the parents was one of ownership
(where they had equal weight in determining the fate of the
embryos). 13 1 In both York and Davis, the emphasis was on an
embryo outside of the human body. Property rights exerted, where
granted, are still external to the human body.
In a third example, external rights were also the issue where a man
sued to obtain the monetary gain of the use of his cells to create a
profitable cell line. 132 In part of his argument, he claimed that he had
five embryos in her uterus. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
128 The court indicated that language such as "our pre-zygote" and the provision that
in the event of a divorce, the ownership "must be determined in a property
settlement" indicated a recognition by the defendants that the plaintiffs did have
property rights in the embryo. Id. at 426.
129 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993).
130 The implication is that the embryos are in a temporary category somewhere in the
middle of the continuum from property to person. It may also be that the more
permanent solution would ultimately be to define them as one or the other. Id. at
597.
131 It was ruled that the lower court's decision to allow normal procedure in
disposing of unused embryos was correct. For the Davises, this meant that relative
interests of each spouse to either the use or the deliberate refraining from the use of
the embryos must be weighed. Id.
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property rights in the cells removed from him during the course of his
treatment. Because he never agreed that his cells could be used by the
researchers to develop a new cell line, he claimed that they had
converted his property based on the belief that the cells were still his
property (because he had not released them) even after they were
removed from his body. 13 3 The argument had been accepted by the
lower court, but was not confirmed by the California Supreme Court.
Instead, that court sustained the demurrers of the defendants to the
cause of action of conversion, citing that the burden that would be
placed on researchers to confirm consent before utilization of human
body fluids in research would be too great.13 4 Here again, the case
focused on the ability of one to define products of his body external to
himself as his property.
Applications ofProperty Law Concepts
Implantation of microchips concerns an internal property interest in
the self because placement of the device involves breaking the skin to
place a foreign object within the body permanently. It may be likened
to the use of an artificial eye or a pace-maker. However, in those cases,
the implant is desired. In the case of the microchip, there is only a
convenient accounting system and repository for government
information. Thus, new questions such as whether or not property rights
can be extended to oneself now arise.
If York could be used as a precedent, it would then be possible to
extend the right from a frozen embryo removed from the body, to
internal bodily organs. If embryos outside an individual's body are his
132 The plaintiff patient had a rare form of leukemia. His doctors took many samples
of his blood and bodily fluids from which they harvested cells to create the Mo cell
line. The importance of the created line was that it could be sold to researchers who
wished to use the cells to determine how best to combat the disease. Moore v. Regents
of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990).
133 The researchers never informed him of their ultimate goals but rather insisted that
the harvesting of the bodily fluids was a necessary part of the treatment of his
condition. Id. at 126.
134 The following rationale was provided by the court: "The extension of conversion
law into this area will hinder research by restricting access to the necessary raw
materials.... At present, human cell lines are routinely copied and distributed to other
researchers for experimental purposes, usually free of charge. This exchange of
scientific materials, which is still relatively free and efficient, will surely be
compromised if each cell sample becomes the potential subject matter of a lawsuit."
Id. at 144.
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or her property, why then couldn't the embryos inside the body also be
that individual's property? From there the conclusion that anything
within an individual's body was the property of that individual, or that
the body as a whole is property if its components are, could be reached.
York is somewhat different however, because concerns and interests in
reproductive freedom enter into disputes over fetuses, embryos and
contraception in general. 135 York or Davis or other cases concerning
reproductive rights and technologies are therefore not the best models
for the microchip, but they are closest in substance. 136 Additionally,
the very closest legally applicable statutory precedent is the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act. Unfortunately, as previously stated, because this
Act covers intrusions into self only after death, it is not directly
applicable either.
As stated previously, in the absence of close precedent, and in the
face of emerging technology, it is sometimes necessary to forge new
legal concepts to cover the previously unanticipated developments of
science. The use of microchip implants in humans is such an instance,
wherein the application of novel legal theories is required, because of the
novelty and the direness of the implications for humans. The concept of
property should be extended to oneself as concerns internal matters to
prevent technology from swallowing up the individual.
One important aspect of property is the owner's right to exclude
others from it. It follows that if an individual can be said to have
property rights in himself, he can exclude others from invading his
body which he controls as his property. Thereafter, if it is recognized
that the individual has that right to prevent intrusions into his own
body under property law, he can invoke Fourteenth Amendment
protection to dissuade others or the government from requiring the
placement of foreign objects in his body or at minimum provide
adequate compensation.
Those principles can be analogized to the scenario of governmental
mandate of microchip implantation. If the government desires to
135 There are very famous cases concerning abortion which touch upon the concept of
the self as property, but these concerns are too closely intermingled with emotional
questions of reproductive freedom to provide a clear basis for comparison.
136 In the situation that courts begin to mandate Norplant for child abusers, the same
arguments might be made for self as property. However, here again, the reproductive
freedom issue would overshadow other concerns.
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mandate microchip implantation, it must provide just compensation for
those implanted. The question would then become how to value this
level of intrusion. Compensation required would include money
damages for the initial implantation, 137 as well as carrying a foreign
substance, 138 difficult calculations indeed. Even if an amount could be
calculated, it is unlikely that the government could give its value in cash
because the total amount required for compensation of all individuals
would be prohibitively high. 139
Thus, if property interests were recognized in self, the compensation
required by each individual from the government to implant the chip in
each individual would be very great. The renumerative aspects of the
program would effectively make it difficult to uniformly mandate the
implantation of the microchip. 14 0 To overcome this obstacle, the
government might insist on some form of nonmonetary compensation.
For example, a tax break, an additional legal holiday or some other
compensatory program might be invoked which did not involve an
actual exchange of money on the part of the government.
In summation, property rights in self should be recognized in the
case of mandated microchip implantation. 141 This would ensure that
individuals receive compensation for their inconvenience, though the
government may provide nonmonetary compensation which would be
less satisfactory.
137 The compensation might be for pain and suffering, if any in the initial insertion,
as well as emotional distress.
138 Other compensation might be for side-effects of carrying the implant such as
discomfort, irritation, or emotional distress. Certain individuals may also make claims
for other physical ailments if they feel that they have been worsened or brought on by
the implantation.
139 Even if the compensation were a nominal amount, such as a dollar, this cost
would be high when multiplied by the number of U.S. citizens. The cost becomes
prohibitive when added to the costs of implantation, and maintenance of records to
run the program.
140 If these arguments that self is property fail, instead, the fact that the act of
microchip implantation forces deprivation of life might be proffered to invoke
Fourteenth Amendment protection from a deprivation of life theory. Life would be
deprived because part of the individual's body would now be occupied by the
government. This would not be a total deprivation of life (such as death) as is
commonly associated with this principle. It is not inconceivable that partial
deprivation of life by microchip implantation could be covered.
141 If the microchip implantation is voluntary, compensation will not be applicable.
This itself brings up another interesting point, as the government may follow the logic
that the mandated implantation is completely voluntary, to avoid remuneration.
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The Need for Legislation
Although microchip implantation might be introduced as a
voluntary procedure, in time, there will be pressure to make it
mandatory. A national identification system via microchip implants
could be achieved in two stages. Upon introduction as a voluntary
system, the microchip implantation will appear to be palatable. After
there is a familiarity with the procedure and a knowledge of its benefits,
implantation would be mandatory. To forestall this, legislative
protection for individual rights must be enacted. For example, a recent
poll indicates that safeguards would increase by 11% the number of
people willing to accept health care identification numbers.142
Legislation which concerns and protects the consentual implants
might address two possible problems. First, laws should protect minors.
Though a child may be too young to give his own consent, the parents
may be allowed to make the decision. At some age, the child should be
allowed to decide whether or not he or she wants to keep the implant.
Second, laws should allow an implantee to remove a chip at will. These
safeguards should insure that once implanted, the microchip can be
removed without further legal action. For example, if the individual
enters a contract with a service to store medical records on a microchip,
she should be able to end it. That is, a commercial institution should
not have the power to insist that the microchip remain, even if only for
a short time. Also commercial parties should not "own" the implant.
Once it is in the individual, it belongs to that individual and not the
corporation providing the service. In this way, the individual will be
free, for example, to remove a chip or reinstall another.14 3 That
decision should rest solely with the implantee.
To avoid a governmental mandate, citizens may advocate for an
outright ban. This drastic measure may also be necessary in a system
142 The survey, conducted by Louis Harris and Associates in conjunction with Alan
Westin, showed that 60% would agree to a health care identification number. The
proposal would be even more acceptable to a greater number of Americans according
to the pollsters, when additional safeguards were proposed such as "criminal penalties
for improper use of the information" and "the personal right to sue someone who
misused their health care ID number." Safeguards Allay Distrust of ID Efforts, The
Wall St.J., Feb. 10, 1995, atB1.
143 Commercial entities will likely insist on certain types of insulation from liability
concerning the implantation, but we do not explore that side of the issue.
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that is initially voluntary, for it may well be the precursor to a mandate.
A voluntary program will lead to the desensitization to the loss of legal
rights. When the government subsequently announces a mandate, it is
conceivable that the public would acquiese by reason of familiarity with
the benefits obtained, without adequate consideration of the
implications. If at that point, many people have already chosen
implantation and reaped its benefits, then it is less likely that they will
protest. Thus, an outright ban may be the surest form of protection.
Short of that, the best way of preventing incipient problems is to
protect rights before desensitization.
That all of these protections against microchip implantation should
fail must also be considered. If none of the current protections is strong
enough to prevent mandatory implantation, legislation must be enacted
to ease the very great intrusion into individual privacy. Minimally, if the
government is to initiate broad usage, it must provide assurances. Of
utmost importance would be a guarantee of the limited access of the
information contained on the microchip or within associated databases.
It would be essential that information access be severely limited. Such
protections could be modeled after the Consumer Credit Protection
Act and the Privacy Acts. 14 4 For example, individuals should have the
opportunity to review all records kept on or in connection with
microchips 145 and be given the opportunity to correct them.146
144 Robert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New
Technological Age, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 893, 898 (1984). The Census Act as well as
the I.R.S. Code "restrict disclosure of information collected except for certain limited
statutory exceptions." Id. at 898.
145 In his testimony on Capitol Hill on Mar. 14, 1995, Gregory T. Nojeim
enumerated several safeguards for guarding the privacy of citizens where a national
identification system is required. One requirement is "immediate, automatic
notification to any person about whom the data base is queried.., with the
opportunity to contest unauthorized transmission of the information before it occurs."
146 Lack of current legal protection notwithstanding, the individual citizen may still
have options open to him to oppose implantation after it has occurred. Though
governmental entities are generally thought of as having immunity from liability in
tort, it is conceivable that the government, the manufacturer of the implant or the
person that implants the microchip could have product liability charges leveled against
them. Individuals might claim that the implants have given them headaches, cancer,
brain tumors, impotence or a great host of other ailments. Thus, the individual could
demand removal of the device on the basis that it contributed to or worsened some
illness in his body, should the legislative protections and banning attempts fail.
Ramesh: Time Enough? 407
Summary and Conclusion
Three categories of rights are relevant to implanting microchips in
humans: common law, constitutional and property. The common law
concept of bodily integrity precludes nonconsensual implantation.
When microchips constitute a legal search, the Fourth Amendment
applies to preclude the government from using devices with read-write
and tracking capabilities, but a warrant could legitimize scanning a read
only or read-write device. Property rights might be applied to prevent
intrusion without just compensation. This would seem to require
expanding current law, but novel and unique situations may spawn
novel applications of laws.
Of the approaches described, it appears that the closest parallels and
thus the strongest protection are afforded by common law right of
bodily integrity. Though cases have generally concerned death or birth
issues, in contrast with permanent insertion of a foreign substance into
the body, the analogies are much stronger than in two other branches of
the law discussed. Concerning constitutional rights, the strongest
protection is afforded with certainty only against the most complicated
device, the one with read-write and tracking capabilities, for which
there is not yet evidence of a marketable device. It is much more likely
that the read only or read-write implant would be initially used.
The common law right of bodily integrity seems most weighty and
convincing, especially where law-abiding citizens are forced to undergo
implantation. If only criminals must be implanted, as opposed to the
population at large, it will be more difficult to argue against
implantation in the face of the increased latitude of governmental
control over law-breakers.
Although use of such a device at first appears farfetched,
examination of the existing technology and the potential utility proves
that microchip implantation is both possible and, for some purposes,
desirable. Beginning with voluntary introduction, Americans may be
lulled into accepting them. This article thus sounds a warning bell. The
time to prevent grievous intrusion into personal privacy by enacting
appropriate legislative safeguards is now, rather than when it is too late.
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